U.S. sanctions don’t show any sign of altering Russian behavior – and they could even be counterproductive. It might be time to take a leaf out of America’s Cold War playbook and find ways of cooperating with Russia to de-escalate tensions, suggests Kimberly Marten in the New Republic.
“For example, many senior U.S. military officers favor restoring regular interactions with their Russian counterparts on security issues. Congress banned most ‘military to military’ activities -- such as seminars and joint training exercises -- in 2015. But curtailing these interactions does not harm Russia. Instead, it makes potential confrontations more dangerous, by depriving military leaders of insight into their adversaries’ strategic thinking. The resumption of communication might even lead to new agreements: Compacts reached by military officers in 1972 and 1989 helped prevent escalation when U.S. and Soviet military ships and aircraft encountered each other in international waters and airspace.”
Marten suggests that the best place to start could be a cyber accord. Why now?
“Because Putin fears, at a level approaching paranoia, U.S. efforts at ‘regime change,’ and Russia has its own presidential election coming up in March. Putin, or his chosen successor if he decides not to run, will almost certainly win another six-year term -- unless the United States disrupts things by, say, releasing a cache of compromising material that turns the Russian population against him. To avoid that possibility, Putin might just find an anti-doxing agreement to be useful. And if Putin either didn’t agree to, or didn’t comply with, a limited cyber accord, it would undercut Russia’s already controversial efforts in the U.N. to be seen as a world leader on cyber policy.”
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“For example, many senior U.S. military officers favor restoring regular interactions with their Russian counterparts on security issues. Congress banned most ‘military to military’ activities -- such as seminars and joint training exercises -- in 2015. But curtailing these interactions does not harm Russia. Instead, it makes potential confrontations more dangerous, by depriving military leaders of insight into their adversaries’ strategic thinking. The resumption of communication might even lead to new agreements: Compacts reached by military officers in 1972 and 1989 helped prevent escalation when U.S. and Soviet military ships and aircraft encountered each other in international waters and airspace.”
Marten suggests that the best place to start could be a cyber accord. Why now?
“Because Putin fears, at a level approaching paranoia, U.S. efforts at ‘regime change,’ and Russia has its own presidential election coming up in March. Putin, or his chosen successor if he decides not to run, will almost certainly win another six-year term -- unless the United States disrupts things by, say, releasing a cache of compromising material that turns the Russian population against him. To avoid that possibility, Putin might just find an anti-doxing agreement to be useful. And if Putin either didn’t agree to, or didn’t comply with, a limited cyber accord, it would undercut Russia’s already controversial efforts in the U.N. to be seen as a world leader on cyber policy.”
Back to International Relations
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